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Social Democracy, War, and the Welfare State
PAUL ADAMS
The University of Iowa
Many writers have discerned links between the welfare state and social
democracy. A few have examined the connections between the welfare
state and war. The links connecting war, social democracy, and the
welfare state are here examined, and it is argued that all three can be
fruitfully understood as aspects of a tendency to state capitalism which
prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century but which has in-
creasingly been offset by a countervailing tendency to internationali-
zation. The welfare state and social democracy, as national-state centered
phenomena resting on the capacity of individual states to manage their
own segments of the world economy, flourished in the first period but
have been undermined in the second. The tendency to militarism and
war has flourished in both.
As an official historian of British social policy in World War II,
Richard Titmuss (1950) was impressed by the extent to which
the war had stimulated and shaped the growth of social provi-
sion in Britain. In a later essay on "War and Social Policy" (1953,
p. 86), he generalized the point, arguing that the "aims and con-
tent of social policy, both in peace and in war, are thus deter-
mined-at least to a substantial extent-by how far the co-
operation of the masses is essential to the successful prosecu-
tion of war." War was, then, a key determinant of the welfare
state. Titmuss's argument, I have suggested, gains explanatory
force if it is modified to take account of the extent to which the
war in question constitutes a crisis for the state and of the role
of other crises, such as the Great Depression, in stimulating and
legitimating social welfare developments. But even in the United
States, where war has generally been seen as bringing to an end
a period of social reform, war has had a profound impact on
welfare state development. (This point was developed in an ar-
ticle for this journal, and subsequent book, which, taking Tit-
muss as its starting point, compared the impact of World War II
on the state's intervention in certain areas of health policy in
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Britain and the United States (Adams, 1977, 1982). If World War II
had less dramatic results for American than for British social
policy, the explanation lies in the weaker threat posed by the
war to the American state or capital, and the lesser vulnerability
to internal pressures from the working dass. In this account, the
state was understood, not, as in Titmuss, as an expression of the
collective will and interest, but as a condensation of the balance
of dass forces, which may be more or less capable of cohesion
and coherence. Explanation of social welfare growth in different
countries had to take account of the nature of the crisis to which
the state was exposed, its vulnerability to threats from without
and below, the nature of the state system itself and its capacity
for coherent policy development. Social policy was seen as being
pressed out between the needs of capital for a regulated supply
of efficient labor power and for order on the one hand, and
working dass pressure for adequate standards of health educa-
tion, and economic security on the other.
Social Democratic Research
A much larger body of writing has in recent years taken
comparative welfare state research in a different direction while
also emphasizing the importance of the capacity of the working
dass to assert its interests. It has pointed to the political strength
of organized labor, and related institutional factors, in deter-
mining the extent to which governments pursue welfare state
goals (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 1978, 1980; Myles, 1984;
Shalev, 1983; Stephens, 1980). While many writers have found
evidence for this line of argument, critics have objected on both
empirical and methodological grounds. They have argued that
political parties do not make much difference in programs or
redistributional effects, or that the historical specificity and lim-
ited number of countries studied do not permit the generali-
zations made by the theorists of working class strength (Bollen
and Jackman, 1985; Pampel and Williamson, 1988).
It is not to these objections that I wish to turn, but rather to
the duster of political assumptions made by this research. One
reflection of these is the choice of indicators of working dass
strength, commonly the presence and duration of social demo-
cratic parties in government (number of cabinet posts, years of
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continuous government, etc.). A highly centralized labor move-
ment, capable of negotiating a social contract on behalf of labor
as a whole, and of enforcing the outcome on individual unions
and rank-and-file workers, is also seen as indicating working
dass strength and as associated with higher and more redistri-
butive social spending.
At a more general level, we find two sets of assumptions,
one having to do with the relation of the state to the realization
of working class interests, or socialism, the other involving the
relation of those interests to social democratic parties and union
leaderships. In the first case, the state is seen as the vehicle for
the achievement of socialist goals. Through the election of social
democratic representatives, legislation will be enacted subject-
ing the capital accumulation process to social control and sub-
ordinating markets to politics. The welfare state, in at least one
version of this perspective (Stephens, 1980), is both an aspect
and a mechanism of the transition from capitalism to socialism.
The aim, then, is to win governmental power through parlia-
mentary elections and to use the state to control the national
economy in the interests of working people, to transform the
nation-state into what the Scandinavian social democrats call a
"people's home."
In this view the organizations of the working dass are the
labor unions and the social democratic party, representing re-
spectively the economic and political aspirations of workers. The
union leaders represent the workers in their industry or trade,
while the social democratic party represents the class as a whole.
That these assumptions are less than self-evident is sug-
gested by the fact they have all been strenuously challenged
within the socialist and labor movements since their first ap-
pearance. For example, Marx and Engels fought fiercely against
statist strands in socialist thinking, as in their opposition to
Lassalle and his followers in the German movement (e.g., Marx,
1974, p. 339-59). They emphasized that socialism could only be
achieved by the working class itself through its struggles against
capital, that this process would involve the overthrow and dis-
mantling of the capitalist state and its replacement by a workers'
state. Many later marxists emphasized the global character of
capitalism, a world system that could not be escaped or tamed
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within a single national economy. In denouncing the statism,
reformism, and nationalism of the social democrats (as the right
wing alone of European Social Democracy came to be called),
revolutionary socialists also challenged the claims of the refor-
mist parties, and of the trade union bureaucrats to which these
parties were linked, to represent the interests of the working
class. Thus, Lenin (1966, p. 257-58) commented on the British
Labour Party:
Of course, most of the Labour Party's members are working men.
However, whether or not a party is really a political party of the
workers does not depend solely upon a membership of workers
but also upon the men that lead it, and the contents of its actions
and its political tactics.... From this, the only correct, point of
view, the Labour Party is a thoroughly bourgeois party, because,
although made up of workers, it is led by reactionaries, and the
worst kind of reactionaries at that, who act quite in the spirit of
the bourgeoisie.
And Trotsky (1973, p. 63) criticized the "characteristics of con-
servatism, religiosity, national conceit" of all the party's leaders
and urged (1973, p. 81) the performance of "an immense service
to historical progress" in the form of the discrediting of "Fabi-
aniam, MacDonaldism, pacifism": "[Wie must point out to the
workers the true countenance of these complacent pedants, prat-
tling eclectics, sentimental careerists, liveried footmen of the
bourgeoisie." In the view of their left critics these parties, far
from representing workers' interests, played a vital role in sub-
ordinating them to the state and the national capitalist class. As
for the unions, the contradiction between the bureaucracy, a
conservative stratum of full time officials with distinct privi-
leges, incomes, working conditions, life styles, and organiza-
tional priorities, and the rank-and-file became as important for
revolutionary analysis as the ignoring or denial of it was for
reformists (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1986).
The schism between the reformist and revolutionary wings
of European socialism became open and dear in the First World
War. The action of the representatives in the Reichstag of the
German Social Democratic Party (the SPD, the oldest and largest
section of European Social Democracy) in voting for war credits
on August 4, 1914 signalled the breakup of the Second Inter-
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national. In country after country reformist social democrats
(those who believed in a peaceful, parliamentary road to so-
cialism) who had only yesterday vowed to oppose the imperialist
war and the sending of workers to kill each other for the profits
of their exploiters now found reasons to rally to the national flag.
Indeed the right wing socialists played a crucial role in sustain-
ing the war effort, as was recognized by the German chancellor,
Bethmann Holweg, in 1917:
The trade unions complain that they no longer control their people,
who are incited by the radicals who say that the Imperial social
democrats have done nothing for them. It is absolutely essential
that the right wing of the social democrats are strengthened once
more. For what is to be done if the government can no longer count
on the help of the trade unions in combatting the strike movement?
(Kirby 1986, p. 61).
World War I ended with the triumph of socialist revolution
in Russia and its defeat in Germany. The war not only brought
the rift between reformists and revolutionaries to a head. It also
clarified many of the points at issue, even though in several
cases this only became dear to the participants in the course of
their struggles, or even after the event. It was out of this war
that social democracy emerged as a distinct tendency character-
ized by a national, reformist, and statist conception of the so-
cialist project, a perspective that would prove remarkably well
suited to daiming the welfare state for its own. One way to
illuminate this development and the linkages that connect it with
war and the welfare state is to examine it from the standpoint
of the tradition which lost out in socialism's "great schism"
(Schorske, 1955), first in Germany at the end of World War I,
and then, with the resulting isolation and degeneration of the
Russian Revolution, throughout the world. That is the classical
marxist tradition-internationalist, revolutionary, anti-statist,
anti-militarist-associated in this split with Luxemburg in Ger-
many and Trotsky, Lenin, and the Bolsheviks in Russia, and
Gramsci in Italy.
Imperialism and War
With the growth of the socialist movement in Germany at
the end of the nineteenth century in a long period of crisis-free
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
capitalist expansion, with the enlargement, centralization, and
bureaucratization of the unions, all the characteristic assump-
tions of reformist social democracy emerged and gathered
strength. It was a period which all wings of the party recognized
as non-revolutionary and as requiring a struggle for reforms
rather than, in the short run, for power. The relegation of the
revolutionary goal to a matter of ritual utterance detached from
day to day practice affected even such champions of marxist
orthodoxy as Karl Kautsky, who polemicized against the open
revisionism of Fabian-influenced Eduard Bernstein. As the threat
of war grew, so did the divisions within the party.
One form these differences took was the question of war
itself. Kautsky had in 1909 argued the orthodox position that
"the present-day arms race is above all a consequence of colonial
policy and imperialism" and that therefore propaganda for peace,
apart from the struggle for socialism, was of little use (Kirby,
1986, p. 1-2). Three years later he had shifted his position, now
arguing that instead of the imperialist division of the world
through war, the great powers might form a cartel, "a federation
of the strongest" who would renounce their arms race and co-
operate in the exploitation of world markets (Kautsky, 1970,
p. 46). This "ultra-imperialism" offered an alternative to war,
which was not a necessary or inevitable product of capitalist
competition. The war, when it came despite Kautsky's misplaced
optimism, was seen as a terrible mistake, a result of the failure
of the capitalists to understand their own interests.
It was in response to Kautsky, as well as to understand the
capitulation of the Second International parties in the face of
war, that Bukharin and Lenin developed their analyses of im-
perialism (Bukharin, 1972; Lenin, 1964). The argument of Buk-
harin, one of the leading Bolshevik theoreticians and arguably
the greatest marxist economist of the twentieth century, is of
particular importance for understanding both war and the wel-
fare state. For him, capitalism could only be understood as a
world economy in which competition had been reduced within
countries through monopolization and state intervention, only
to be reproduced on an international level. He identifies not only
the emergence of monopoly capital through the fusion of indus-
trial and banking capital, as Hilferding (1981) had done in his
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pioneering work, but also the further tendency to a merger of
private capital and the state, that is, a tendency toward state
capitalism. The argument is developed most fully in The Eco-
nomics of the Transformation Period (Bukharin, 1971, p. 21):
Capitalist national economy has moved from an irrational system
to a rational organization, from a subject-less economy to an eco-
nomically active subject. This transformation has been effected by
the growth of finance capitalism and the fusion of the economic
and political organization of the bourgeoisie. At the same time,
however, neither the anarchy of capitalist production in general
nor the competition of capitalist commodity producers has been
eliminated. These phenomena have not only remained but have
deepened by reproducing themselves in the framework of world
economy. The system of world economy is just as blindly irrational
and subject-less as the earlier system of national economy.
In this conception, capitalism appears as a world system in
which the competing units, or capitals (Bukharin calls them
"state capitalist trusts") are states. These are national blocs of
capital impelled to accumulate by competition with each other
in a world economy which none controls. As Marx (1973, p. 657)
puts it, "The influence of individual capitals on one another has
the effect precisely that they must conduct themselves as capital."
But as competition grows in scale and increasingly takes place
between states so its form changes. Labor productivity is com-
pared, that is, competition takes place, not only through the
exchange of commodities, but also through foreign debt and
military rivalry. Britain and Germany are locked in competition
for markets, and in India, for example, British capital wins out
against German, not because it is more efficient, but because
the British state keeps German capital out. States protect their
national economies and extend their spheres of operation by
building up their military capacity, in order to ensure access to
raw materials and markets or to deny it to competitors.
As Bukharin (1972, p. 125) puts it, "The struggle between
state capitalist trusts is decided in the first place by the relation
between their military forces, for the military power of the coun-
try is the last resort of the struggling 'national' groups of capi-
talists." For both Bukharin and Lenin, war was not an accident
or a mistake, a failure of diplomacy or vision, but something
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that grew organically out of the capitalist mode of production
at the point when the tendencies to concentration and centrali-
zation, inherent in it from its beginnings, reach a certain stage,
the stage of imperialism. "The capitalists divide the world,"
Lenin (1964, p. 253) asserted, "not out of any particular malice,
but because the degree of concentration which has been reached
forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits."
Since capitals grow at uneven rates, however, a disproportion
tends to develop between a country's economic and its political
power. Those countries (Germany and Japan are the most ob-
vious examples) which develop later but faster are unwilling to
accept the existing division of the world among imperial powers
and demand its repartitioning. Periods of peace, therefore, "are
inevitably nothing more than a 'truce' in periods between wars.
Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn
grow out of wars" (Lenin, 1964, p. 295). War, in short, is inher-
ent in capitalist competition, above all in the epoch of
imperialism.
Bukharin, as well as Lenin, developed his analysis of the
world economy in order to illuminate the organic links between
imperialism and war, and to show that the struggle for peace
was inseparable from the struggle against capitalism. The theory
of state capitalism which he developed in the process, however,
has wider explanatory power. It has, for example, been applied
in modified form to the analysis of the Eastern bloc countries,
and the phenomenon of Stalinism, which have been seen as the
purest expressions of state capitalism, as well as to certain de-
velopments in the West, including the growth of state interven-
tion, regulation, planning, and nationalization as well as the
emergence in the post-World War II world of a permanent arms
economy (Cliff, 1974; Harman, 1984; Callinicos, 1982, p. 196-
225). The theory also has important implications, largely unex-
plored, for our understanding of the welfare state and of social
democracy.
The trend toward a world economy of competing state cap-
italisms finds expression in, and makes sense of, the often re-
marked linkage between imperialism and social reform in the
period around the turn of the century (Searle, 1971; Semmel,
1960; Titmuss, 1958). Both conservative authoritarians like Bis-
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marck and reformist social democrats looked to the state as the
organizer and defender of national economic development. The
Boer War, as Titmuss (1958) points out, provided a traumatic
lesson for the British about the importance of "national effi-
ciency" and social solidarity for a successful imperialism. The
working class became a national resource, to be educated, kept
in health, and adequately maintained if productivity and mili-
tary capacity were to match international levels (Harman, 1984).
The mechanisms through which states took on this responsi-
bility ranged from school meals and milk to health and retire-
ment insurance. The welfare state, in sum, emerged as an aspect
of the state's organization of the national economy for competi-
tion in a hostile world.
From its origins in Bismarck's Germany, the welfare state
has been an intrinsically national institution. Vulnerable to ex-
ternal military and economic threats, as well as to internal pres-
sures from their own working classes (on which they depend to
meet those threats), individual states have tried by a variety of
means to manage their own national segments of the world
economy. In addition to various degrees of state ownership or
regulation of industry, fiscal and monetary policy, these efforts
have everywhere included social policy measures designed to
ensure both the reproduction of the labor force at adequate levels
of health, education, and economic security, and social peace
between dasses, so that world standards of military and eco-
nomic efficiency could be attained or approximated.
The ideological support for such statist strategies has taken
a number of different forms, from German romantic national-
ism, through social democracy, fascism, and Stalinism, to a broad
range of Third World nationalisms which mix these ingredients
in varying proportions. The form that has been most closely
associated with the welfare state in advanced industrial Western
states is social democracy. Through its close association with the
trade unions and its historical links to the socialist tradition it
has arguably provided the most successful examples of incor-
porating the working class into modem capitalism, bringing its
consumption under the management of the state, and integrating
social and economic goals in order to maximize accumulation
within the national economy. Thus the political scientist David
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Cameron (1984) finds that large and expensive welfare states
administered by what he calls "left-wing" governments have
been beneficial for capital accumulation because they have fa-
cilitated the more complete and conscious subordination of so-
cial to economic policy, the use of a "social wage" policy to
induce wage restraint, and hence the reduction of labor's share
of the national income, higher profits, and more investment.
Indeed, he argues, this restriction and control of working dass
consumption through "social contracts," negotiated by central-
ized union and employer organizations with the state, has been
in the interests of labor as well as capital (because it resulted in
less unemployment as well as less inflation).
Such an assertion is nicely indicative of the distance that
social democracy has traveled in divorcing the socialist goal of
getting rid of capitalism from the means, the "movement" for
immediate reforms within it. The movement, as Bernstein (1961,
p. xxix) put it, was everything, the final aim nothing. The re-
sults of this displacement have been firstly, an acceptance of the
exigencies of the national capitalist economy as setting the limits
of reform, so that international competitiveness becomes the
fundamental criterion of social policy, and secondly, a friendly
view of the state as the mechanism for transforming capitalism
and subordinating it to social control.
The relation of socialism to the state was a fundamental point
at issue, not only between Lenin, Luxemburg, and Bukharin on
one hand, and the reformist social democrats on the other, but
also even earlier, between Marx and Lassalle (Marx, 1974, p. 339-
59). Already in the nineteenth century Engels had drawn atten-
tion to the tendency for the state's role in the economy to grow,
not only in maintaining the social and political conditions for
capital accumulation, but also as a direct capitalist. At the same
time he warned against confusing that tendency with socialism.
"The modern state," he argued (1969, p. 330), "no matter what
its form, is essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the cap-
italists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. The
more it proceeds to the taking over of the productive forces, the
more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more
citizens does it exploit." Bukharin stood in this classical marxist
tradition, anti-statist but recognizing the increasingly important
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role of the state as a national, collective capitalist, when he wrote
(1982, p. 22), echoing Engels: "In these ways state power absorbs
virtually every branch of production. Not only does it preserve
the general conditions of the exploitative process but, in addi-
tion, the state increasingly becomes a direct exploiter, organizing
and directing production as a collective, joint capitalist."
The question is not simply one of orthodoxy or definition-of
what socialism really "means"-it is also a matter of how one
traces the linkages among war, the welfare state, and social de-
mocracy. Reexamining the great schism from the perspective of
the revolutionary left brings into focus the observation, which
both classical marxist theory and Cameron's findings imply, that
for the working dass, whose reproduction as labor power the
welfare state organizes, national- statist strageties of economic
and social development have not been simply an expression of
that dass's political and economic strength, as social democratic
theorists typically assume. They also represent the use of state
power to restrict and control its consumption in the interests of
developing an internationally competitive economy and military
power. This perspective enables us to see the welfare state in a
new light, as, together with modem militarism and world war,
an aspect of the tendency to state capitalism, to a world system
of economically and militarily competing state capitals. Social
democracy can then be seen as arising on the basis of this ten-
dency and as an ideological expression of it. Its nationalism,
statism, and reformism provided a redefinition of socialism as
an ideology of state-organized collaboration between classes in
the interest of national economic growth and development.
Internationalization, the Welfare State, and the Arms Race
At this point, some qualification of Bukharin's argument is
necessary. For him capitalist development in the early twentieth
century (he died under Stalin's bullets in 1938) involved com-
plementary and contradictory tendencies to state capitalism and
internationalization. That is, capitals competed more and more
as national blocs within an increasingly integrated world econ-
omy. As states gained control over the accumulation process
within their territories, they at the same time were subordinated
to the uncontrollable pressures of competition on a world scale
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from other national capitals. As this happened, competition in-
creasingly took military forms, and ultimately the form of world
war.
Bukharin's view of these phenomena is open to two kinds
of objection. Firstly, as Lenin (Bukharin, 1971) pointed out in
some acerbic marginal notes, he absolutized the tendency to
state capitalism, exaggerating the extent to which states had
been able to suppress competition internally, to organize the
national economy as a single capital (or state-capitalist trust)
and to overcome so far as the internal economy was concerned
the contradictions and tendencies to crisis that were intrinsic to
capitalism as a world system. It was this one-sided conception
of the tendency to state capitalism that led him to see war as the
central contradiction of capitalism in 1929, and to discount the
possibility of economic catastrophe (Callinicos, 1987).
Secondly, and following from this, Bukharin's conception of
internationalization as a world system of self-contained states
violently bouncing off one another like billiard balls provided
an inadequate, one-sided view of a complex reality in which the
world market increasingly disregards and breaks down national
boundaries. Recent developments in particular do not fit the
pattern he outlines. We have seen in the last ten to fifteen years
the emergence of economic crisis on a world scale in the context
of the system's growing integration across national lines. Dis-
cussion of the world economy in terms of nation-states, or even
groups of countries, fails to capture this reality. As Nigel Harris
(1987, p. 200) has put it, "The conception of an interdependent,
interacting, global manufacturing system cuts across the old view
of a world consisting of nation-states as well as one of groups
of countries, more and less developed and centrally planned-
the First, the Third and the Second Worlds."
Understood as a strategy, state capitalism depends on the
capacity of the state to organize a whole national economy, to
deploy resources and repression to force the pace of accumula-
tion, to forge a national capital unit, or state capitalist trust,
which can compete, economically and militarily, in a hostile
world. But with the growing transnational integration of pro-
duction, distribution, and finance, the state has both become
too small a capital unit and has undergone a diminution of its
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autonomy vis a vis the world market. Attempting to create a
self-sufficient, integrated national economy capable of support-
ing, for example, its own automobile industry, has tremendous
costs in terms of technological development, optimal use of labor
and capital, and therefore growth, living standards, and com-
petitiveness. The cost of opting out of the world division of
labor is, in the long run, stagnation.
Competitive pressures of the world economy have, in short,
progressively undermined the capacity of nation-states to man-
age their own territorial segments of the system. As a result,
internationalization has proceeded in a way somewhat different
from that envisaged by Bukharin. Its relation to the tendency to
state capitalism has become more that of a countervailing than
a complementary tendency. The world economy is less an arena
in which states dash against each other while insulating them-
selves from the pressures of global markets, and more a vehicle
for the subordination and integration of nation-states into the
world market.
But the welfare state, and the social-democratic project in
general, depends precisely on what internationalization has un-
dermined, the capacity of states to manage their own economic
turfs. Economically and politically it is a closed system charac-
terized by social solidarity and an intergenerational contract be-
tween members of a defined national community. It implies the
capacity of the state to compete in the world economy as a unit,
with its "own" labor force. But the migration of labor and cap-
ital, the need for governments at all levels to woo investment
with low taxes and deregulation, the need for integration into
the world economy in order to maintain high living standards
and employment levels, all suggest that international market
competitiveness will become an increasingly salient criterion for
social policy. Peter Glotz, a leading ideologue of contemporary
West German social democracy, has argued (1985) in this context
that "national Keynesianism is dead" precisely because states
have lost the capacity to manage their national economies. The
consequence for social democracy has been either that it is com-
pletely unable to deliver in government on the promises it makes
in opposition, or that it offers the uninspiring program of re-
formism without reforms. In either case the "social" content of
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social democracy becomes exiguous to the point of nullity (An-
derson, 1986).
Governmental responses to these developments have almost
everywhere, East and West, involved moves in the direction,
not of increased nationalization and planning, but of privati-
zation, of market-oriented reforms. The attack on the welfare
state in the context of crisis and increased international com-
petitive pressures is well documented and perhaps requires lit-
tle further explanation. It is in part an attempt to cut social
consumption in order to boost profitability, a socialized wage
cut. In other part it aims to reduce the labor and capital market
distortions which social programs introduce and to minimize
their negative impact on economic growth.
Harris (1987) has recently argued that the successes of the
newly industrializing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan,
and Singapore in combining a high level of state economic man-
agement and a strong military apparatus with a ruthless ori-
entation to production for the world market represents a triumph
not of free trade, but of state capitalism in a new form. However
that may be, internationalization has, for relatively dear reasons,
had a corrosive effect on support for the welfare state and, in
general, on earlier state-capitalist strategies and ideologies, so-
cial democratic as well as Stalinist. But what of military spend-
ing and the threat of nuclear war? If state capitalism represents
a phase of capitalist development the inevitable outcome of
which, short of the revolutionary overthrow of the system, is
world war, should not the offsetting tendency, to transnational
integration, lead to peace? Herbert Spencer (1969) argued in the
nineteenth century that state intervention and protectionism
tended inevitably to war and free trade to peace. Of course, for
him any tendency in the direction of state capitalism was an
aberration, not a fundamental and permanent feature of the cap-
italist mode of production. More recently, Harris (1987, p. 202)
has moved some way in this direction, suggesting very tenta-
tively that "as capital and states become slightly dissociated, the
pressures to world war are slightly weakened." The reason is
that, as the transnational character of the world market separates
the interests of capitals from those of particular states, so the
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likelihood is reduced that competition will assume the form of
military conflict between states.
It is true that within blocs, competition between advanced
countries has not tended since World War II to assume military
form, despite powerful protectionist pressures. In part this re-
flects the overwhelming hegemony of the two superpowers in
this period, and the pax americana and pax sovietica they have
been able to impose on their respective allies. But this postwar
order, and in particular the long, arms-fueled boom, set in mo-
tion the forces that would undermine it. Both the United States
and the Soviet Union maintained their preeminent positions in
part by undertaking the major share of the military burden of
their respective blocs. Indeed they still account between them
for over half of world arms expenditures (Sivard, 1985). But
those countries, particularly West Germany and Japan, which
devoted smaller proportions of their investable surpluses to arms
spending were able to raise their capital to labor ratios (by using
robots in automobile production, for example) and thereby
threaten profits of competing national economies like the United
States and Britain. Newly industrializing countries like South
Korea and Taiwan have further weakened American economic
hegemony through carving out niches in the world economy
even while maintaining very substantial military apparatuses.
The result has been falling profit rates and crisis (which have
been persuasively attributed in dassical marxist terms to in-
creasing capital to labor ratios, and the decreasing ability of
arms spending to offset their effect on profits (Harman, 1984).
The economic hegemony of the United States has faltered, while
the harmony among Western national economies fostered by the
long postwar boom have given way to increased protectionist
pressures.
Similar processes were at work in the Eastern bloc. Under
(though not solely because of) the immense burden of arms
spending, Russian growth rates slowed dramatically and prom-
ises of outstripping the West, or even of rapidly rising living
standards, had to be abandoned. Rates of return on investment
dedined in the East as in the West, and as the Soviet Union's
economy weakened so did the stability of its sphere of influence.
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China and Egypt were lost to more or less close alliance with
the West. Eastern Europe, faced with economic problems and
class struggles of its own, above all in Poland, became a drain
on Russian resources rather than a source of direct or indirect
plunder. Both the Soviet Union and its allies sought to relieve
their economic difficulties (above all lack of world-level tech-
nology or the hard currency to pay for it) by closer integration
with the West and its international institutions (the International
Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trace, the
World Bank). As this happened they became ever more closely
bound to its rhythms and subject to the same crisis (Francisco,
1986; Harman, 1983).
The weakening of the economic hegemony of the two su-
perpowers in their respective spheres, the intensification of
competition within and between blocs, meant that the United
States and Soviet Union could ill afford to cut their military
spending in order to invest more productively. Already weak in
market competition, these countries were pushed to restrain so-
cial spending. Their ability to do so depended largely on internal
political requirements and rigidities. But military spending is
different. Like market competition, it has a much more com-
pulsive character than social spending. If one state builds a pub-
lic hospital its rival is not directly impelled to follow suit, but
a new weapons system is another matter. Every new develop-
ment in weapons technology by one superpower compels the
rival to match it, even when doing so weakens the national
economy and ultimately the industrial base on which military
power depends. Indeed the lines between economic and military
competition become blurred as one power (in the present situ-
ation, the United States, the economically dominant one) inflicts
blows on its rival's economy by pushing it to adopt ruinously
expensive responses to its innovations in weapons systems.
The United States and the Soviet Union are pushed toward
responding to their declining relative economic positions, them-
selves in part a consequence of the arms burden they bear, by
reasserting their military hegemony. To do otherwise would be
to risk losing allies, clients, or satellites, and to see the rival's
position grow stronger. It would also be to lose influence, and
ultimately resources, markets, and bases in the less developed
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countries. Here the instability and risk are great. In the postwar
peace among major powers, more than a hundred wars have
been fought outside Europe, Russia, and North America, while
Third World military expenditures have risen fivefold in real
terms since 1960 (Sivard, 1985). The diminishing capacity of the
superpowers to police the world by means of a Yalta-type
"gentlemen's agreement" pushes both governments to a more
aggressive and interventionist military posture.
The risk of a major war, of a nuclear holocaust, is arguably
not weakened by these developments, but strengthened. Peter
Binns (1983) has likened the position of the superpowers to that
of competing firms using dangerous industrial processes, as in
hazardous chemical plants. Each knows it faces the loss of its
entire capital by ignoring costly explosion-preventing safety pro-
cedures and so long as business is expanding advocates of cau-
tion within the firms will prevail over those who want to compete
more effectively by cutting safety costs. But in crisis, when com-
petition is heightened and bankruptcy threatens, the weight of
managerial opinion will shift. At some point, faced with the
choice between the possibility of losing all through an explosion
and the certainty of losing all to rivals through bankruptcy, the
risktakers are likely to prevail. From this perspective, the in-
creased competitive pressures deriving from internationaliza-
tion, crisis, and the weakened position of the superpowers are
the underlying cause of the "new cold war," with its economi-
cally ruinous build-up of arms spending, as well as of the con-
tinued elusiveness of a Kautskyan (or "ultraimperialist") solution
in the form of a fundamental arms limitation agreement. They
have made World War III more, not less likely.
Conclusion
World war, the welfare state, and social democracy, I have
suggested, can all be fruitfully understood as aspects of a ten-
dency to state capitalism which prevailed in the first half of the
twentieth century but which has increasingly been offset by a
countervailing tendency to internationalization. Both tendencies,
as Callinicos (1987, p. 106) argues, "reflect fundamental and per-
manent features of capitalism-respectively its genuinely inter-
national character and its division into capitals with particular
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interests which set them at odds with one another. . . ." But the
relative importance of these tendencies has shifted in the last
thirty years-"the internationalization of capital has come to
predominate over its integration with the state, but not to the
extent of nullifying it." The welfare state and social democracy,
as national-state centered phenomena resting on the capacity of
individual states to manage their own segments of the world
economy, flourished in the first period but have been under-
mined in the second. The tendency to militarism and world war,
unfortunately, has flourished in both.
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